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Goldilocks and the Fourth Amendment: Why the Supreme
Court of North Carolina Missed an Opportunity to Get Officer
Mistakes of Law "Just Right" in State v. Heien*
INTRODUCTION
As the saying goes, ignorance of the law is no excuse.' Under this
maxim, which dates back to Roman law and is familiar among lawyers
and laypeople alike,2 accused persons find little defense in the claim:
"I'm sorry, officer, I didn't know I couldn't do that."' The doctrine
presumes awareness of legal obligations, and those who do not know
their actions are unlawful receive no reprieve from law enforcement
officers as a result of their naivety.' And for good reason-public
policy demands an informed and law-abiding populace and
discourages "the easy-to-assert and difficult-to-dispute claim of
ignorance that would otherwise flow from the lips of any person
facing criminal punishment."I
But what of mistakes of law by those charged with its
enforcement? The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently
grappled with this issue as a matter of first impression in State v.
Heien.6 In Heien, officers stopped a vehicle on the erroneous belief
that its improperly functioning brake light violated the state's vehicle
code.' Reversing the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the supreme
court held "that so long as an officer's mistake is reasonable, it may
give rise to [the] reasonable suspicion" required to conduct a traffic
stop.' In so doing, the court rejected the approach taken by the
majority of jurisdictions and urged by the three-justice dissent-that
* @ 2014 John B. Lyman.
1. See, e.g., Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164, 179 (1822); State Bank v.
Hunter, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 77, 85 (1826).
2. See Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of
Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 342-43 (1998).
3. During a stand-up routine, comedian Dave Chappelle describes an occasion where
he was the passenger in a car driven by his friend, Chip. DAVE CHAPPELLE, KILLIN'
THEM SOFTLY, at 7:45 (UrbanWorks Entertainment 2003). Chip was driving erratically,
and an officer soon stopped the vehicle, prompting Chip's excuse quoted above. Id. at
9:56.
4. See Davies, supra note 2, at 342-43.
5. Id. at 341; see also CHAPPELLE, supra note 3, at 10:32 ("That [excuse] was good,
wasn't it? Because I did know I couldn't do that.").
6. 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012).
7. Id. at 275, 737 S.E.2d at 354.
8. Id. at 282, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
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an officer's mistaken understanding of underlying substantive
statutory law cannot give rise to the requisite level of suspicion
required to sustain a traffic stop. By contrast, a more intermediate
position is exemplified by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit's holding in United States v. Booker9 that
"[a] stop is lawful despite a mistake of law ... if an objectively valid
basis for the stop nonetheless exists.""o
This Recent Development argues that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina should have adopted the Booker approach to officers'
mistakes of substantive law when it confronted the issue in Heien.n
First, the Booker rule is more consistent with prior North Carolina
precedent in that it employs a more appropriate "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry. Second, the Booker rule is most
representative of the balancing test required by the Fourth
Amendmentl 2-it maintains officer flexibility while still protecting
citizens' constitutional rights. Thus, when tempered by appropriate
constraints on post hoc officer claims of independent objective
justifications, the intermediate Booker rule is "just right," and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina missed an opportunity to adopt it
in State v. Heien.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the necessary
background to understand Heien, describing legal standards for traffic
stops under the Fourth Amendment and mistake-of-law
jurisprudence. Part II examines the facts of Heien, the opinion of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals, and the majority and dissenting
opinions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Part III analyzes
the approaches taken by courts in assessing officers' mistakes of law
in the Fourth Amendment context through analysis of the Eighth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Martin,13 adopted by the Heien
majority, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v.
Chanthasouxat,14 favored by the Heien dissent. Part III also
introduces the approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in the Booker line
of cases, and Part IV argues that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina should have adopted the Booker rule. Provided that certain
constraints are present, that rule best embodies the already extant
9. 496 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009).
10. Id. at 722.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996).
13. 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005).
14. 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
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balance between Fourth Amendment liberties and law enforcement
practicalities under North Carolina law.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, TRAFFIC STOPS, AND MISTAKES OF
LAW
A. The Fourth Amendment and Traffic Stops
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects "the people ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures.""s The Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" inquiry is
particularly fact specific and yields different and often conflicting
standards based on the type of search or seizure. 6 The reasonableness
test with respect to traffic stops in particular is an issue that has
generated an exceptionally large volume of litigation."
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized
that law enforcement officials may stop people based on less than
probable cause;'" for traffic stops, a "reasonable suspicion" that a
traffic law has been violated suffices in nearly all jurisdictions,
including North Carolina.19 That is, an officer must hold only a
"reasonable suspicion ... for traffic stops, regardless of whether the
traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected."20 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina described the standard in State v.
Styles21:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
preponderance of the evidence. The standard is satisfied by
some minimal level of objective justification. This Court
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20 (prohibiting "general
warrants"). In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment's restrictions apply to state law enforcement officers in addition to
federal agents, and in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that the
exclusionary rule applies to the states as well.
16. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (describing the requirements for
and the scope of warrantless searches and seizures); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (describing the Court's strict preference for warrants).
17. See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.3 (5th ed. 2012) ("In recent years more Fourth Amendment
battles have been fought about police activities incident to a stopping for a traffic
infraction .. . than in any other context.").
18. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
19. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008); LAFAVE, supra
note 17, at § 9.3(a).
20. Styles, 362 N.C. at 415, 665 S.E.2d at 440.
21. 362 N.C. 412, 665 S.E.2d 438 (2008).
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requires that [t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable
facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as
viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer,
guided by his experience and training. Moreover, [a] court must
consider the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture in
determining whether a reasonable suspicion exists.22
Furthermore, any traffic offense committed by a driver provides a
legitimate basis for a traffic stop, even if the stop is merely a pretext
for a drug search.23 Thus, generally speaking, a law enforcement
officer must have an objective, reasonably articulable suspicion that a
traffic violation has occurred to initiate a stop of a vehicle. While this
standard is difficult enough to apply in ordinary circumstances,2 4
factoring in an officer's mistake of law compounds the inquiry's
complexity.
B. Mistakes of Fact and Mistakes of Law
The courts treat mistakes of fact and mistakes of law differently.
An accused person has made a mistake of fact if his conduct would
not be unlawful had the surrounding facts been as he believed them
to be.25 Similarly, where an officer acts pursuant to an incorrect
perception of a physical fact, he has made a mistake of fact.26 Courts
22. Id. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 439-40 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
23. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1996); State v. McClendon, 350
N.C. 630, 635-36, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999) (adopting Whren).
24. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ("The concept of reasonable
suspicion ... is not 'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.' "
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983))). But see Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 US. 318, 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Over the past thirty years, it appears
that the Terry rule has been workable and easily applied by officers on the street.").
25. See Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3
(1957). By way of example, consider the following situation: If one honestly believes that
the white, powdery substance in his possession is flour, this factual mistake would
exonerate him of the crime of possession of cocaine. See Thomas W. White, Note, Reliance
on Apparent Authority as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 781
(1977). If, on the other hand, he knows the substance to be cocaine but honestly believes
that possession of cocaine is not criminal, his mistake of law would not insulate him from
prosecution for the crime of possession. See id.
26. See United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir. 2000). In Cashman,
an officer stopped a car which had a seven- to ten-inch crack in the windshield under a
state law requiring that no vehicle's windshield be "excessively cracked or damaged." Id.
at 586 (quoting WIS. ADMIN. CODE Transp. § 305.34(3) (1996)). The defendant argued
that the crack was not "excessive" under the regulation. Id. at 587. The court disagreed,
finding the focus of the defendant's argument "misplaced" because "[t]he pertinent
question instead [was] whether it was reasonable for [the officer] to believe that the
windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree." Id. at 587. Thus, "[g]iven the evident
length of the crack and its proximity to the portion of the windshield swept by the wipers,"
the court concluded that the stop was supported by probable cause. Id.; see also United
1016 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
generally excuse the accused's mistakes of fact, reasoning that the
actor's factual beliefs preclude the requisite mental culpability as to
an element of the offense.27 Similarly, courts typically tolerate
reasonable mistakes of fact by law enforcement officers, since "what
is reasonable will be completely dependent on the specific and usually
unique circumstances presented by each case." 28
On the other hand, where one acts unaware of or under a
misinterpretation of substantive law, he has made a mistake of law.29
When the accused has made a mistake of law, he finds little relief in
the courts;" when an officer makes a mistake of law, the adjudicatory
consequences are less clear.
Police mistakes of law in the realm of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence can be classified into two broad categories-those of
constitutional law and those of statutory law. Mistakes of
constitutional law can be further subdivided into two types. The first
relates to the constitutional validity of a statute invoked by an officer
as the grounds for a stop or arrest."1 The second involves Fourth
States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding a traffic stop where the
officer reasonably relied on a police vehicle computer which erroneously indicated expired
registration).
27. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1985).
28. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 137-38 (2009) (excusing an illegal search based on
reasonable reliance on a clerical error); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001)
("Officers can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the
existence of probable cause or exigent circumstances,... and in those situations courts will
not hold that they have violated the Constitution."); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949) ("Because many situations which confront officers in the course of
executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some
mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men . . .
29. See White, supra note 25, at 781.
30. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing the "ignorance of the law is
no excuse" adage and the rationale behind it).
31. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 76 (2011).
Professor Logan illustrates this category using two cases. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to
a search incident to an arrest premised on violation of an ordinance that was later struck
down as unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 37-40. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the
Court upheld the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to a state law permitting
officers to search the premises of car dealerships without a warrant, which was later
invalidated as "vest[ing] State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and
how long to search." Id. at 346. In each instance, the Court emphasized that the deterrence
rationale for the exclusionary rule is not served when officers reasonably rely on
legislation; exclusion would only be proper when a statute is "so grossly and flagrantly
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws."
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38; see also Krull, 480 U.S. at 355 (explaining that an officer cannot
"be said to have acted in good-faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a
reasonable officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional"). Professor
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Amendment procedural doctrine, where the constitutional
reasonableness of officer behavior, and possible application of the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, is assessed by
.comparing the conduct to court-made standards.3 2 Courts generally
excuse both types of police mistakes of constitutional law."
This Recent Development concerns police mistakes of statutory
law, where officers misunderstand the statutes or ordinances invoked
as grounds for an investigatory stop or arrest. In this sphere, courts
traditionally have been far less forgiving.34 Historically, these
mistakes of law, even if premised on objectively reasonable
misunderstandings, triggered tort liability." The more recent remedy
has been application of the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence
obtained pursuant to an unlawful search or seizure may not be
introduced at trial to convict the accused. In the context of traffic
stops, examples of officers' mistakes of law include erroneous
interpretations of vehicle safety requirements," license tag and
registration regulations," and regulations of driving conduct.3 9 As
Marceau similarly describes these mistakes as "changing-settled-law mistakes," where "an
officer specifically relies on legal authority ... but subsequent to his actions a court
substantially changes the nature of the protection such that his actions were constitutional
at the time of the arrest but are unconstitutional under the new precedent." Justin F.
Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687, 744 (2011).
32. Logan, supra note 31, at 77; cf Marceau, supra note 31, at 745 (characterizing this
type of mistake as "when an officer relies on then-prevailing interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment and this interpretation is deemed unconstitutional by a subsequent case").
Professor Logan points to the Supreme Court's decision in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964), as illustrative of this area. See Logan, supra note 31, at 77. In Stoner, the Court
cited earlier cases invalidating searches of hotel rooms by federal agents in holding
unconstitutional a warrantless search of the defendant's hotel room. See Stoner, 376 U.S.
at 489.
33. See Logan, supra note 31, at 78; Marceau, supra note 31, at 744-45.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Song Ja Cha, 597 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010)
(describing how the failure of law enforcement to ascertain key Fourth Amendment
restraints "demonstrates why mistakes of law can and should be deterred"); Malcomson v.
Scott, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885) ("An officer of justice is bound to know what the law
is, and if the facts on which he proceeds, if true, would not justify action under the law, he
is a wrong-doer.").
35. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. i (1965) ("[N]o protection is
given to a peace officer who, however reasonably, acts under a mistake of law other than a
mistake as to the [constitutional] validity of a statute or ordinance.").
36. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
392 (1914).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003)
(rear-view mirror); State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 275, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2012)
(taillights).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 496 F.3d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (license tags),
vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (registration stickers).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
further discussed in Part III, courts have typically followed one of
three approaches in determining whether an officer's mistake of
substantive law can provide the necessary reasonable suspicion to
justify a traffic stop.40 With this legal framework in mind, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina got behind the wheel to test out and decide
upon its preferred route.
II. STATE V. HEIEN
A. Facts and Procedural History
On the morning of April 29, 2009, Sergeant Matt Darisse of the
Surry County Sheriff's Office was "conducting criminal interdiction"4 '
on Interstate 77.42 He noticed a Ford Escort approach a slower-
moving vehicle, causing the driver of the Escort to apply the car's
brakes. 43 When the brakes were engaged, Sergeant Darisse noticed
that the right rear brake light did not illuminate, so he initiated a
traffic stop of the Escort, suspecting an equipment violation." Upon
reaching the vehicle, Sergeant Darisse informed the driver, Maynor
Javier Vasquez, that he had pulled the Escort over "for a non-
functioning brake light." 45 The defendant, Nicholas Brady Heien, was
the vehicle's owner and its only passenger.4 6 When Vasquez was slow
to produce his driver's license and registration upon request and
showed signs of nervousness during the exchange, Sergeant Darisse
asked Vasquez to exit the vehicle and wait behind it while Sergeant
39. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006) (use of turn
signal); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (use of turn signal); State
v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Minn. 2004) (not providing a "buffer lane" for stopped
emergency vehicles); State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008)
(impeding traffic); State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562, 565, 633 S.E.2d 459, 461 (2006) (use of turn
signal).
40. See infra Part III.
41. State v. Heien, 214 N.C. App. 515, 515, 714 S.E.2d 827, 827-28 (2011) [hereinafter
Helen COA 1], rev'd, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012). While left undefined by the
court of appeals in its opinion, "criminal interdiction" may be generally defined as "traffic
enforcement with an emphasis on more serious criminal behavior that might be occurring
during traffic stops." State v. Zetina-Torres, 400 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
Typically, law enforcement officers conduct such activity on highways and focus their
efforts on drug trafficking. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 999 (D.
Neb. 2004).
42. Heien COA 1, 214 N.C. App. at 515, 714 S.E.2d at 827-28.
43. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 272, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (2012).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id.
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Darisse verified the documents.4 7 Sergeant Darisse then wrote
Vasquez a ticket for an improperly functioning brake light and
returned his license and registration.4 8
Meanwhile, Deputy Mark Ward, also of the Surry County
Sheriff's Office, arrived to assist Sergeant Darisse.49 Deputy Ward
briefly questioned Heien concerning the party's travel plans, and
Heien indicated that they were driving to Kentucky." Vasquez had
previously told Sergeant Darisse that he and Heien were headed to
West Virginia."' When Vasquez acquiesced to additional questioning
after his documents were returned," Sergeant Darisse asked Heien
for permission to search the Escort." Heien consented to the search,
which revealed cocaine and other drug paraphernalia.54
At trial, Heien moved to suppress the cocaine obtained from
what he alleged to be an unconstitutional search of the Escort." After
the trial court denied the motion, Heien pled guilty to attempted
trafficking of cocaine, though he reserved the right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress.56 On appeal, after a lengthy
discourse in statutory interpretation, the North Carolina Court of
47. State v. Heien, _ N.C. App. _, _, 741 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (2013) [hereinafter Heien
COA Il], aff'd, - N.C. - _, 749 S.E.2d 278, 279 (2013) (per curiam).
48. Helen, 366 N.C. at 272, 737 S.E.2d at 352.
49. Heien COA II, - N.C. App. at -, 741 S.E.2d at 5.
50. Id. at _, 741 S.E.2d at 5-6; Heien, 366 N.C. at 272, 737 S.E.2d at 352.
51. Heien, 366 N.C. at 272, 737 S.E.2d at 352; Heien COA II, - N.C. App. at -, 741
S.E.2d at 4.
52. After deciding the mistake-of-law issue, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of Heien's challenges to the
scope of the search. See Heien COA II, - N.C. App. at -, 741 S.E.2d at 3. The two-judge
majority upheld the trial court's finding of a consensual encounter and affirmed that
court's denial of Heien's motion to suppress. See id. at _, 741 S.E.2d at 7. A dissenting
opinion by Judge McGee, see id. at _, 741 S.E.2d at 7-9 (McGee, J., dissenting), triggered
mandatory review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, which affirmed. See State v.
Heien, _ N.C. -, _, 749 S.E.2d 278, 279 (2013) (per curiam).
53. See Heien, 366 N.C. at 272, 737 S.E.2d at 352.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 273, 737 S.E.2d at 353.
56. Heien COA 1, 214 N.C. App. 515, 516, 714 S.E.2d 827, 828 (2011), rev'd, 366 N.C.
271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012).
57. Id. at 518-21, 714 S.E.2d at 829-31. The State alleged three traffic code violations
in support of Sergeant Darisse's stop. First, section 20-129(g) of the North Carolina
General Statutes reads as follows:
No person shall sell or operate on the highways of the State any motor vehicle,
motorcycle or motor-driven cycle . .. unless it shall be equipped with a stop lamp
on the rear of the vehicle. The stop lamp shall display a red or amber light visible
from a distance of not less than 100 feet to the rear in normal sunlight, and shall be
actuated upon application of the service (foot) brake. The stop lamp may be
incorporated into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.
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Appeals concluded that "having a single operable brake light is
legally sufficient."" Then, without even addressing whether the
officer's mistake of law was excusable, that court unanimously held
"that a vehicle having only one operable brake light is not a valid
justification for a traffic stop."5 9 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina granted the State's petition for discretionary review to hear
the case.?
B. Supreme Court of North Carolina Majority Opinion
The only issue appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was "whether an officer's mistake of law may . . . give rise to
reasonable suspicion to conduct a routine traffic stop."61 The court
pointed out that this issue was one of first impression and identified
State v. Barnard62 as being instructive in its resolution.63 In Barnard,
an officer observed a vehicle remain stopped at a traffic light for
approximately thirty seconds after the light turned green before
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-129(g) (2013) (emphasis added). Second, subsections 20-129(a) and
(d) provide, in pertinent part:
(a) When Vehicles Must Be Equipped.-Every vehicle upon a highway within this
State shall be equipped with lighted . .. rear lamps as required for different classes
of vehicles....
(d) Rear Lamps.-Every motor vehicle ... shall have all originally equipped rear
lamps or the equivalent in good working order, which lamps shall exhibit a red
light plainly visible under normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500
feet to the rear of such vehicle.
Id. § 20-129(a), (d). Third, section 20-183.3 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Safety.-A safety inspection of a motor vehicle consists of an inspection of the
following equipment to determine if the vehicle has the equipment required by
Part 9 of Article 3 of this Chapter and if the equipment is in a safe operating
condition:
(2) Lights, as required by G.S. 20-129 or G.S. 20-129.1.
Id. § 20-183.3(a)(2).
58. Heien COA 1, 214 N.C. App. at 522, 714 S.E.2d at 831. The panel also urged the
General Assembly to update the antiquated statutory language. See id.
59. Id.
60. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 275, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2012).
61. Id. The State did not challenge the intermediate court's statutory interpretation.
See id.
62. 362 N.C. 244, 658 S.E.2d 643 (2008).
63. Heien, 366 N.C. at 275, 737 S.E.2d at 354.
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making a lawful left turn." The officer then stopped the vehicle for "a
perceived, though apparently non-existent, statutory violation of
impeding traffic,"65 though he also testified that remaining stopped at
a traffic light for thirty seconds after it turned green "definitely would
be an indicator of impairment."" The Barnard court then cited Whren
v. United States67 and State v. McClendon' for the proposition that the
"constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not
the officer's subjective motivation," and held that an officer's mistake
of law will not render invalid a stop otherwise supported by
reasonable suspicion to believe an actual law had been broken.69 The
Heien majority summarized its reading of Barnard: "[A]n officer's
subjective mistake of law will not cause the traffic stop to be
unreasonable when the totality of the circumstances indicates that
there is reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is violating
some other, actual law."70
Next, the Heien majority introduced the two most common
answers to the officer mistake-of-law question that various state and
federal courts have offered. In one corner, represented by the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Chanthasouxat, are the courts that hold
that a police officer's mistake of law, no matter how reasonable,
cannot provide reasonable suspicion necessary to sustain a traffic
stop.7 1 In the other corner, exemplified by the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in Martin, are the courts that hold that reasonable suspicion is
still satisfied despite an officer's mistake of law, as long as the mistake
is objectively reasonable.72
64. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 245, 658 S.E.2d at 644.
65. Id. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 645. Notably, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 592 S.E.2d 733 (2004), held that an eight- to ten-
second delay does not give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person is driving under the
influence of alcohol. Id. at 134-35, 592 S.E.2d at 737. Courts in other jurisdictions have
also considered the issue whether such delayed reactions may give rise to the required
level of suspicion. See Barnard, 362 N.C. at 257-58, 658 S.E.2d at 651-52 (Brady, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases from Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and New Jersey);
Roberson, 163 N.C. App. at 133-34, 592 S.E.2d at 736-37 (citing cases from Idaho,
Minnesota, and New Jersey).
66. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 247, 658 S.E.2d at 645 (majority opinion).
67. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
68. 350 N.C. 630, 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999).
69. Barnard, 362 N.C. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 645-46 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13;
McLendon, 350 N.C. at 634-36, 517 S.E.2d at 131-32).
70. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 276, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354-55 (2012) (citing Barnard,
362 N.C. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 645-46).
71. See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); see also
infra note 85 (listing courts that follow the Chanthasouxat rule).
72. See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 2005); see also infra
note 85 (listing courts that follow the Martin rule).
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The majority adopted the Martin approach, finding "the Eighth
Circuit's reasoning to be more compelling," and offered several legal
and policy-based justifications in support." First, the rationale behind
the rule "seem[ed] ... to be consistent with the primary command of
the Fourth Amendment-that law enforcement agents act
reasonably.""4 Second, the majority emphasized that "the reasonable
suspicion standard does not require an officer actually to witness a
violation of the law before making a stop."" Third, and related to the
second reason, the majority argued its rule was more consistent with
the rationale behind the reasonable suspicion doctrine itself:
" '[R]easonable suspicion' is a 'commonsense, nontechnical
conception[] that deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.' "76 Fourth, the majority reasoned that its approach
upholds the traditional case-by-case, "totality of the circumstances"
test applied when determining the existence of reasonable suspicion,
which, by its very nature, rejects bright-line rules such as that
proposed by the Eleventh Circuit in Chanthasouxat.77
As for its more policy-based justifications, the Heien majority
argued that a contrary approach would "discourage our police
officers from conducting stops for perceived traffic violations" and
thus jeopardize roadway safety.78 Finally, the majority contended that
its approach allows appellate courts to regard all police mistakes the
same, thereby facilitating law enforcement and judicial efficiency.7 9
Thus, applying its rule to the facts at hand, and upon consideration of
the totality of the circumstances, the majority concluded that
Sergeant Darisse held a "reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct
the traffic stop."80
73. Heien, 366 N.C. at 278, 737 S.E.2d at 356.
74. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) ("The essential
purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of
'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order 'to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions ..... )); see also Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 ("[T]he validity of a stop
depends on whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in the
circumstances." (citation omitted)).
75. Heien, 366 N.C. at 279, 737 S.E.2d at 356.
76. Id. at 280, 737 S.E.2d at 357 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695
(1996)) (alterations in original).
77. Id. at 281, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
78. Id. at 279, 737 S.E.2d at 357.
79. See id. at 282, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
80. Id. at 283, 737 S.E.2d at 359.
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C. Supreme Court of North Carolina Dissent
Given the highly contentious nature of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence generally,"' and the hard-drawn battle lines between
the Martin and Chanthasouxat approaches to officers' mistakes of
law, Heien unsurprisingly drew a passionate three-justice dissent.
Justice Hudson, writing for the dissent, identified a single sentence
from the majority opinion as representative of its flaws: "Police
officers should be entitled to interpret our motor vehicle laws
reasonably when conducting routine traffic stops."82 Justice Hudson
lamented this introduction of "subjectivity and vagueness" into
Fourth Amendment analysis and effective overruling of prior
precedent." She warned against the creation of a statutory
interpretation role for law enforcement and its slippery slope and
separation of powers implications.' Justice Hudson also pointed out
the overwhelming acceptance of the Chanthasouxat approach among
other courts, arguing that "[w]hile using an imprecise tool like circuit-
counting to justify a position should be done with care, the
overwhelming acceptance of the position directly opposite that taken
by the majority" was cause for concern.
81. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1468 (1985) (characterizing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as "a mass of
contradictions and obscurities").
82. Heien, 366 N.C. at 280, 737 S.E.2d at 357 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 283-84, 737 S.E.2d at 359-60; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing the
majority's misapplication of North Carolina precedent).
84. Heien, 366 N.C. at 284, 737 S.E.2d at 359-60. Justice Hudson also cited Barnard,
though relying on that case for the proposition that officer subjectivity is irrelevant to the
reasonableness inquiry, which instead depends only on objective facts. See id. at 285, 737
S.E.2d at 360 (citing State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645-46 (2008)).
Justice Hudson later warned that the majority "has now opened a Pandora's box by
approving of the use of evidence obtained solely because of a traffic stop based upon an
officer's mistake of law." Id. at 284, 737 S.E.2d at 360.
85. Id. at 285-86, 737 S.E.2d at 360-61. Justice Hudson identified seven federal
circuits that take some form of the Chanthasouxat approach. See id. at 286, 737 S.E.2d at
361 (citing United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 260 n.16 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958,
961 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)
("[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not
objectively reasonable."); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
2000); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)); infra Part III.B
(discussing Chanthasouxat). Additionally, Justice Hudson observed that district courts in
the Second Circuit also follow Chanthasouxat, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 11
Cr. 228, 2011 WL 5843475, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2011), while the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits have yet to directly address the issue, see United States v. Jones, 479 F. App'x 705,
712 (6th Cir. 2012) ("This court has not yet answered whether an officer's objectively
reasonable mistake of law can establish reasonable suspicion for a search or seizure.");
United States v. McHugh, 349 F. App'x 824, 828 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e assume,
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In contrast to the majority, the Heien dissent favored adoption of
the Chanthasouxat approach, albeit somewhat tacitly. Thus, the
justices aligned themselves along the traditional battle lines, with the
alternative Booker approach mentioned only in a footnote in Justice
Hudson's dissenting opinion. 86 With this introduction to the primary
methodologies employed by courts in resolving the police mistake of
law issue, it is appropriate to delve more deeply into the circuit split
and begin discussion of the Booker approach.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Eighth Circuit Approach: United States v. Martin
The Eighth Circuit and a few state courts87 have held that the
Fourth Amendment allows a law enforcement officer to conduct a
seizure based on a reasonable mistake of statutory law." United States
v. Martin exemplifies this approach. The facts of the case mirror those
of Heien: officers stopped a vehicle based on the mistaken belief that
without deciding, that an officer's reasonable mistake of law may not provide the objective
grounds for reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop."). The D.C. Circuit follows a
more intermediate approach. See United States v. Booker, 496 F.3d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir.
2007), vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009) ("A stop is lawful despite a mistake
of law ... if an objectively valid basis for the stop nonetheless exists."); infra Part III.C
(discussing Booker). The Eighth Circuit is alone among the federal courts in excusing an
officer's reasonable mistake of law. See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001-02
(8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the police officer's mistaken belief that the law required
motorist to have two functioning brake lights was not objectively unreasonable); infra Part
III.A (discussing Martin). As for state courts, California, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and New York apply the Chanthasouxat
approach. See People v. White, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 372, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003);
McDonald v. State, 947 A.2d 1073, 1079 (Del. 2008); United States v. Debruhl, 38 A.3d
293, 293 (D.C. 2012); Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); State
v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 649 (Iowa 2010); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 819
(Minn. 2004) (en banc); State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Mo. 2007); People v. Rose,
889 N.Y.S.2d 789, 790 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). Meanwhile, Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, and
South Dakota follow the Martin approach. See McConnell v. State, 374 S.E.2d 111, 113
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Moore v. State, 2005-CT-02063-SCT (1 21), 986 So. 2d 928, 935
(Miss. 2008); City of Wilmington v. Conner, 761 N.E.2d 663, 664 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001);
State v. Wright, 2010 SD 91, 1, 791 N.W.2d 791, 792 (S.D. 2010).
86. See Heien, 366 N.C. at 286 n.1, 737 S.E.2d at 361 n.1 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
87. See supra note 85.
88. See, e.g., Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001-02. Some courts draw a distinction when officers
invoke mistaken interpretations of the laws of other jurisdictions as justifications for traffic
stops. See, e.g., Travis v. State, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34-35 (Ark. 1998) (condoning a stop based
on an Arkansas deputy's "reasonabl[e], albeit erroneous[]" belief regarding Texas law);
People v. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (excusing a California
officer's mistaken interpretation of the New Jersey Vehicle Code, since it "is not
something the officer is reasonably expected to know or has an opportunity to routinely
enforce").
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the jurisdiction's traffic code required two working brake lights, when
in fact "the Code require[d] only that [a] vehicle be equipped with a
stop light in good working order."" The Martin court quickly clarified
its view of the issue: "The determinative question is not whether
Martin actually violated the Motor Vehicle Code by operating a
vehicle with one defective brake light, but whether an objectively
reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion
that Martin was committing a code violation.""0 The court determined
that the mistake was objectively reasonable, and therefore upheld the
stop.91
Courts have offered several reasons for excusing reasonable
mistakes of law by police officers. The primary rationale is found in
the wording of the Fourth Amendment itself-that the people should
be protected from unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures.92
When applicable portions of a jurisdiction's traffic code are
"counterintuitive and confusing," it seems appropriate to forgive
objectively reasonable misinterpretations.9 3 Similarly, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stressed that assessments of the reasonable
89. Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotation marks omitted). The provision at
issue reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or cause to knowingly permit to be
driven on any public road any motor vehicle which is in such unsafe condition so
as to endanger any person or is not at all times equipped with the following:
(3) STOP LIGHTS: All motor vehicles shall be equipped with a stop light in good
working order at all times. Such stop lights to be automatically controlled by brake
adjustment.
Id. at 1000-01 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 1001.
91. Id. at 1002. For an example of an unreasonable mistaken interpretation of a
statute, see United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
argument for reasonableness of mistaken statutory interpretation where there was no
evidence that the officer received training to make stops for cracked windshields, and
where officer's mistake of law was "unmoored from actual legal authority").
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
93. Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 348 (2001) ("[W]e cannot expect every police officer to know the details of
frequently complex penalty schemes . ); United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913
(8th Cir. 1999) ("[A reviewing court] should not expect state highway patrolmen to
interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney.");
Logan, supra note 31, at 83 ("The expectation that the law is 'definite and knowable' is no
more tenable for police today than it is for the lay public." (citations omitted)); Wayne A.
Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1443-
45 (2001) (surveying the recent proliferation of state, local, and federal criminal
provisions).
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suspicion and probable cause standards are to be "nontechnical,
common-sense judgments of laymen." 94 Courts wish to avoid such a
high standard for fear of creating a "systematic disincentive to
arrest.""
In the same vein, justification for excusing mistakes of law aligns
with the Court's recent decision in Herring v. United States.96 In that
case, the majority held that "when police mistakes are the result of
negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or
reckless disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal
deterrence does not 'pay its way.' "9 While the officer's mistake in
Herring would be better characterized as one of fact-reliance on a
faulty arrest warrant-the analogy still holds. If a court were to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of a reasonable mistake of law,
where "negligence . .. rather than systemic error or reckless disregard
of constitutional requirements" may be a factor in the reasonableness
inquiry, any additional deterrence would be de minimis.98
Similarly, another court has argued that "[i]t makes no sense to
speak of deterring police officers who acted in the good-faith belief
that their conduct was legal by suppressing evidence derived from
such actions unless we somehow wish to deter them from acting at
all." 99 Finally, there is an "appealing symmetry" in applying the
rationale behind the qualified immunity doctrine in this context as
well." Thus, the Eighth Circuit approach is buttressed by some
degree of legal underpinning. However, shortcomings remain-the
94. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235-36 (1983).
95. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351.
96. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). In Herring, the officer contacted a county clerk to determine
whether there were any outstanding warrants against Herring. Id. at 137. Finding nothing
in the records available to her, the clerk consulted her peer in a neighboring county, who
reported that her records showed that there was an active arrest warrant against Herring
for failure to appear. Id. In reliance on this representation, the officer stopped Herring
and arrested him. Id. However, there had "been a mistake about the warrant"-it had
been recalled months earlier, but the database the clerk checked had not been updated to
reflect that fact. Id. at 137-38.
97. Id. at 147-48 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6 (1984)).
98. Id.; cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("As with any remedial
device, the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.").
99. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 842 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per
curiam).
100. Logan, supra note 31, at 89. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields police
from personal financial liability in subsequent federal civil rights suits where officers "have
reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence of probable
cause or exigent circumstances." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001), rev'd on other
grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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rule allows too much officer leeway at the expense of individual
liberties.
B. The Majority Approach: United States v. Chanthasouxat
The Eleventh Circuit and a significant majority of its sister
circuits, as well as several state courts, take the opposite approach."o'
These courts have held that an officer's "mistake of law cannot
provide the [requisite] objective basis for reasonable suspicion or
probable cause," thus invalidating a search or seizure premised on
those grounds.102
The Eleventh Circuit's discussion in United States v.
Chanthasouxat provides a useful model for this approach. There, an
officer stopped the defendant's van for failure to have a rear-view
mirror, erroneously believing that omission to be a violation of a city
ordinance. 0 3 The Chanthasouxat court prefaced its analysis by
describing the distinction between mistakes of fact and mistakes of
law, " then justified the different legal implications depending on the
type of mistake.0 ' The court next characterized the precise issue
before it somewhat differently than did the Martin court: "[T]he
correct question is whether a mistake of law, no matter how
reasonable or understandable, can provide the objectively reasonable
grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause." 106 Answering
that question, the court held that an officer's mistake of law cannot
afford reasonable suspicion or probable cause to validate a traffic
stop. 07
Building from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Chanthasouxat,
there are a number of persuasive justifications for categorically
invalidating stops premised on an officer's mistake of law, regardless
of the mistake's objective reasonableness or the officer's good faith.
101. See supra note 85.
102. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).
103. See id. at 1273-74. The ordinance in question required only that a driver be able to
"obtain[] a view of the street to the rear by looking backward from the driver's position"
or have "a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the streets for a distance of
at least 200 feet of the rear of the vehicle." Id. at 1274 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA. GEN.
CITY CODE § 10-11-5).
104. See id. at 1276-77; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the distinction).
105. See Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1276-78.
106. Id. at 1279. The court openly conceded that the officer's mistake was reasonable.
Id. The officer testified at trial that he stopped the defendant's vehicle "based on his
training, [a] magistrate's interpretation of the statute [that failure to have an inside rear-
view mirror violated the statute], and the fact that he had written over 100 tickets for the
same violation." Id. at 1274.
107. Id. at 1279.
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These rationales may be broadly categorized as policy reasons and
law enforcement reasons.
At bottom, the argument goes, excusing officers' mistakes of law
undermines basic rule-of-law principles."os That approach, its
opponents contend, "violate[s] the fundamental principle that a
criminal statute that is so vague that it does not give reasonable notice
of what it prohibits violates due process."'" Those who reject the
Martin approach also feel that it violates the fundamental separation
of powers doctrine: "The job of the police is to enforce the law as it
has been written by the legislature and interpreted by the courts."1 o
In addition, supporters of the Chanthasouxat approach assert that
legislatures should be held accountable for their vague laws rather
than penalizing citizens for their shortcomings in statutory drafting."'
Opponents of the Martin methodology are also wary of its effects
on law enforcement and the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
Their most basic argument is that officers should know the law, and
thus not knowing the law is per se unreasonable." 2 There is also the
108. Logan, supra note 31, at 90; see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 233 (3d ed. 1994) ("[P]olice in a
democracy are not merely bureaucrats. They are also ... legal officials, that is, people
belonging to an institution charged with strengthening the rule of law in society.").
109. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1278-79; see also United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274,
278 (5th Cir. 1998) ("It should go without saying that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed."). The Chanthasouxat court subsequently noted that, while traffic ordinances
are generally not criminal statutes, it still refused to use their vagueness against a
defendant. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279. This argument carries particular weight in this
context, where arguably pretextual stops based on vague statutes often lead to searches
revealing criminal activity. Additionally, basic fairness dictates that those who enforce the
law should be held to a higher standard than normal citizens, who are penalized for their
mistakes of law. See Logan, supra note 31, at 90-95 (arguing that excusing even reasonable
police mistakes of law is a disservice to basic rule-of-law values).
110. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 288, 737 S.E.2d 351, 362 (Hudson, J., dissenting); see
also Logan, supra note 31, at 95-101 (discussing the separation-of-powers rationale). But
see Daniel N. Haas, Comment, Must Officers Be Perfect?: Mistakes of Law and Mistakes of
Fact During Traffic Stops, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1035, 1051 (2013) ("[C]ourts that allow
mistakes of law have not abdicated this power [to check officers of the executive branch]
and continue to review the officer's actions for reasonableness.").
111. See Heien, 366 N.C. at 288, 737 S.E.2d at 362. Similarly, Professor Logan argues
that the judiciary plays an important role in this context of "lawless seizures" as a check on
the "natural alliance" between the executive and legislative branches in crime-control
policy. See Logan, supra note 31, at 101.
112. See Marceau, supra note 31, at 743 ("It is a hallmark of substantive criminal law
that ignorance of the law is no defense. The rationale most commonly advanced for this
seemingly harsh result is that the refusal to reward ignorance is necessary 'so that the
proper standard of conduct will be learned and respected by others.' " (quoting Robert L.
Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507,
509 (1986))); see also Logan, supra note 31, at 91 ("Reciprocal expectations of law-
abidingness between government and citizens can scarcely be expected to endure if one
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fear that allowing officers to make stops based on mistakes of law will
provide them with wide latitude to abuse their authorityll3 and may
unintentionally discourage officers from diligently learning the law.114
Opponents argue that the Martin approach inappropriately injects
subjectivity into the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness
analysis."' Finally, Chanthasouxat supporters fear that the Martin rule
represents "the functional equivalent of a 'good faith exception' for
stops conducted in contravention of the law," which courts have
consistently rejected.H1 6 Thus, strong legal and practical backing exists
for the Chanthasouxat rule. However, this approach also suffers from
a deficiency-its categorical invalidation of stops based on mistakes
of law is too restrictive of legitimate law enforcement activity.
C. The D.C. Circuit Approach: United States v. Booker
In addition to the Chanthasouxat and Martin approaches to the
constitutionality of seizures based on officers' mistakes of law, there
exists a third view on the issue. Characterized in a footnote in Justice
Hudson's Heien dissent as "a middle-of-the-road approach,""' the
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Booker"' held that "[a] stop is lawful
despite a mistake of law ... if an objectively valid basis for the stop
party-the government-need not uphold its end of the bargain." (footnotes omitted)); cf
State v. Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654, 659, 712 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2011) ("It is not unreasonable
to expect law enforcement officers to be familiar with the laws they are charged to
enforce."). But see Haas, supra note 110, at 1047 (characterizing the argument as "weak
given the complexity of laws across the states").
113. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[I]f officers
are allowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been
violated even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of
traffic infractions as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy
rights excessive."). But see Haas, supra note 110, at 1051 (downplaying the argument, since
the mistaken officer must show that the error was reasonable).
114. See Helen, 366 N.C. at 287-88, 737 S.E.2d at 361-62 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 284, 737 S.E.2d at 360 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
696-97 (1996) ("[T]he issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or
constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the
established facts is or is not violated." (alterations in original))).
116. See id. at 286, 737 S.E.2d at 361; see also United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000) ("To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they
properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey."). But see Davis
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428-29 (2011) (holding that when officers conduct a
search in good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule does
not apply since excluding evidence in such cases deters no police misconduct and imposes
substantial social costs).
117. Helen, 366 N.C. at 286 n.1, 737 S.E.2d at 361 n.1.
118. 496 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009).
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... exists" despite an officer's reasonable, good-faith mistake."' This
methodology is superior: it preserves both Fourth Amendment
protections and law enforcement practicalities and is the most
consistent with existing North Carolina precedent."o
In Booker, three police officers passed the defendant's vehicle as
they were traveling in the opposite direction in their unmarked car.121
Observing that the vehicle's front license tag seemed to be displayed
improperly, the officers elected to conduct a traffic stop.122 After
making a U-turn, the officers finally caught up to Booker's vehicle,
finding it parked and its occupants disembarking.123 The officers
alighted from their vehicle and identified themselves. 124 The
passenger fled and was not apprehended, though the officers
handcuffed the driver, Booker, and detained him while they secured
the scene.125 When Booker informed the officers that he did not have
a driver's license, they arrested him, conducted a search of the
vehicle,'126 and recovered contraband.127 The trial court found that,
while a dealership's license plate was in fact properly affixed to the
rear of the defendant's vehicle, and thus in compliance with a specific
ordinance regarding dealer's tags,'28 the vehicle's front tag was
improperly affixed beneath the windshield.129
The appellate court began its analysis by stating the majority
rule: "[S]tops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-
faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutional."' 0 The court
then qualified the majority rule by excusing such a mistake if a
119. Id. at 722.
120. See infra Part IV.A.
121. Booker, 496 F.3d at 719.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated judgment, and remanded the case
to the D.C. Circuit for reconsideration in light of its recent holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. 332 (2009). Booker v. United States, 556 U.S. 1218 (2009). Gant redefined the scope
of the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement. See Gant, 556 U.S.
at 343.
127. See Booker, 496 F.3d at 719.
128. The pertinent regulation provides: "Motorized ... vehicles identified by a dealer's
tag ... shall display only one (1) valid identification tag on the rear of the vehicle." D.C.
MUN. REGS. tit. 18, § 422.2 (2007) (emphasis added).
129. See Booker, 496 F.3d at 723. Another D.C. regulation requires "[o]wner's
identification tags" to be "securely fastened." § 422.4 (mandating that tags be fastened in a
clearly visible place and position and "not less than twelve inches (12 in.) from the
ground").
130. Booker, 496 F.3d at 722 (citing United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir.
2006)).
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distinct, objectively valid reason for the stop exists nonetheless.131
Applying this rule to the facts at hand, the court forgave the officers'
mistake of law and upheld the seizure on two grounds. 13 2 First, the
court concluded that the officers had an objectively reasonable
perception of a front license tag violation. 33 Then, the court
determined that the officers reasonably failed to see the rear dealer's
tag because they were distracted by the vehicle's fleeing occupants
and "were not close enough" to see the rear tag." Therefore, the
officers made an objectively reasonable mistake of fact.135 Had the
physical facts accurately reflected the officers' perceptions (that is,
had there actually not been a properly affixed dealer's tag on the rear
of the vehicle), there would have been an independent and readily
observable statutory violation.36 The court summarized its
conclusion: "[A]lthough Booker had not violated any law regarding
the display of tags, the officers reasonably thought initially that he
131. See id. (citing United States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). In
Southerland, officers stopped the defendant's vehicle upon observing that its front license
plate had been placed on the dashboard, which they believed violated Maryland traffic
control laws. See United States v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In
fact, while Maryland law does not require that front license plates be affixed to the
bumper, it does mandate that vehicles have license plates that are "[s]ecurely fastened"
and "clearly visible." Id. at 1359 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 13-411(a), (c)
(LexisNexis 2007)). The court found "it objectively reasonable for the officers to suspect
that Southerland's dashboard plate was in violation of Maryland law, even assuming they
were mistaken that the law required display of the front plate on the bumper." Id.; see also
United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2006) ("In situations where an
objective review of the record evidence establishes reasonable grounds to conclude that
the stopped individual has in fact violated the traffic-code provision cited by the officer,
the stop is constitutional even if the officer is mistaken about the scope of activities
actually proscribed by the cited traffic-code provision."); cf Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 153 (2004) ("[The arresting officer's] subjective reason for making the arrest
need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause.");
United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding an arrest where
the original basis-driving with an expired license-was later determined invalid, but
probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for a different offense readily apparent at
the time of the stop-reckless driving).
132. See Booker, 496 F.3d at 724.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Judge Rogers, dissenting, disagreed with the court's characterization of the
officers' failure to see the rear dealer's plate: "[T]he record does not support the further
conclusion that the officers' failure to notice the rear tag on Booker's car was objectively
reasonable" since the officers "had ample opportunity, prior to stopping Booker, to
determine whether there was a tag on the rear of Booker's car and failed to do so." Id. at
727 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 724 (majority opinion).
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had and then, again, reasonably failed to recognize that he had not,"
thus justifying the stop.'37
Unfortunately, the Booker court's conclusion seems to be
premised on a roundabout application of the rule. After all, the court
had to rely upon an officer's mistake of fact to trigger the requisite
"independent, objectively reasonable" grounds for the stop. Still, the
rule remains a good one,38 as it is more representative of the ideal
"reasonableness" balance required by the Fourth Amendment than
either the Martin or Chanthasouxat approaches.
IV. WHY THE BOOKER APPROACH IS BEST AND WHY NORTH
CAROLINA SHOULD ADOPT IT
A. Booker's Consistency with North Carolina Precedent
The Booker approach is more consistent with prior North
Carolina case law than either the Martin or Chanthasouxat
approaches, since it represents a proper "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry.'39 That is, the majority in Heien misapplied
the standard. An officer's subjective beliefs have no place in a Fourth
Amendment analysis and therefore should not factor into the totality
of the circumstances.14 0 Rather, the standard should encompass the
totality of the circumstances in the sense that another, objectively
valid reason for the stop nonetheless exists. Application of the
Booker rule would yield the same result in previous North Carolina
cases whether the stop was found to be constitutional or was later
determined to be unconstitutional.
First, both the majority and dissenting opinions in Heien cite to
State v. Barnard in support of their arguments.14 ' The Heien majority
summarized the holding in Barnard: "[A]n officer's subjective
mistake of law will not cause the traffic stop to be unreasonable when
the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is reasonable
137. Id. at 725.
138. The rule has also been applied, though less explicitly, in other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the validity of
a stop based on the officer's mistaken belief that any tinting of the front windows of a
vehicle violated the traffic code, when in actuality the defendant's tint exceeded the
allowed tint).
139. See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (requiring the
court to "consider the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture in determining
whether a reasonable suspicion exists" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) ("The principal components
of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be ... viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer." (emphasis added)).
141. See supra notes 62-70, 84 and accompanying text.
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suspicion that the person stopped is violating some other, actual
law."l 42 This conclusion fits squarely with the Booker rule. In
Barnard, the defendant was stopped for the nonexistent violation of
impeding traffic flow. 143 But, that same behavior also indicated to the
officer, drawing on his experience and training, that the defendant
was driving while impaired-an independent, actual violation, which
thus gave rise to the requisite "reasonable suspicion" that the court
later found to be objectively reasonable.1"
Second, the Booker rule is also consistent with other North
Carolina decisions in State v. Iveyl' and State v. McLamb,14 in which
the appellate court affirmed the exclusion of evidence obtained
during stops based solely on officers' mistakes of law. In Ivey, an
officer stopped the defendant's vehicle when he made a right turn
without signaling, which the officer thought qualified as "unsafe
movement" under the traffic code.147 However, the layout of the
intersection was such that the defendant could only turn right from
where he was situated, and there were no other vehicles or
pedestrians in the immediate vicinity.148 Thus, the defendant was not
in violation of any law.149 As the State presented no other basis for
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the defendant had
committed a traffic violation, the court found the stop
unconstitutional.150
142. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 276, 737 S.E.2d 351, 354-55 (2012) (emphasis added)
(citing State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008)).
143. State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248,658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (2008).
144. See id. The two dissenting opinions in Barnard vigorously disagreed with the
majority's conclusion. See id. at 248, 658 S.E.2d at 646 (Brady, J., dissenting)
("Defendant's thirty second delay at a traffic intersection after the light turned green did
not violate any law and, standing alone, could not have raised a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity."); id. at 261, 658 S.E.2d at 654
(Hudson, J., dissenting) ("Because impeding the flow of traffic is not a violation of law and
because the thirty second delay is easily explained as innocent, I do not agree that under
the totality of these circumstances, the officer here had reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant's vehicle.").
145. 360 N.C. 562, 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Styles,
362 N.C. 412,665 S.E.2d 438 (2008).
146. 186 N.C. App. 124, 649 S.E.2d 902 (2007).
147. Ivey, 360 N.C. at 563, 633 S.E.2d at 460.
148. Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461-62. The officer's vehicle was "some distance behind"
the defendant's. Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461.
149. Id. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461 ("[T]he duty to give a statutory signal of an intended
turn does not arise in any event unless the operation of some other vehicle may be
affected by such movement.").
150. See id. at 566, 633 S.E.2d at 462. Interestingly, the court made sure to point out
that "driving while black" was not valid grounds for a stop. See id. at 564, 633 S.E.2d at
461. The court distinguished the facts of the instant case from those of Whren, where
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Similarly, in McLamb, a deputy observed the defendant's vehicle
round a curve in the road at approximately thirty miles per hour.1s'
Believing the speed limit to be twenty miles per hour for that
particular roadway, when in fact it was fifty-five miles per hour, the
deputy stopped the vehicle on those grounds alone.152 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as
a result of the seizure, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed.' Citing Ivey and several of the cases following the
Chanthasouxat approach, the appellate court determined that the
deputy's stop of the defendant's vehicle for the mistaken speed limit
violation was not objectively reasonable and was therefore
unconstitutional.154
Finally, the Booker rule is consistent with the North Carolina
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Osterhoudt.5 s In Osterhoudt,
the state highway patrolman observed the defendant "make a wide
right turn onto Fifth Street whereby half of [the] defendant's car went
over the double yellow line into the turning lane for traffic coming in
the opposite direction." 156 The patrolman stopped the defendant for
"driving left of center" and "failing to keep his vehicle on the right
half of the highway."15 7 However, the applicable law, section 20-
146(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes, provides an exception
to the requirement that "a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half
of the highway" when the "highway [is] divided into three marked
lanes."' 8 Despite the patrolman's mistaken belief as to the
applicability of section 20-146(a), the court of appeals still addressed
"whether [his] proffered justification for stopping [the] defendant
[was] sufficient to establish an objectively reasonable basis for the
stop."'59 The court held that the patrolman's testimony regarding his
grounds for the stop was sufficient to establish violations of three
other statutory provisions.60 Thus, "regardless of his subjective belief
officers witnessed three motor vehicle violations committed by the defendant, even if the
primary reason for the stop was pretextual. See id. at 565-66, 633 S.E.2d at 462 (citing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996)).
151. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. at 124, 649 S.E.2d at 902.
152. Id. at 124-25, 649 S.E.2d at 902-03.
153. Id. at 128, 649 S.E.2d at 904.
154. Id. at 126-27, 649 S.E.2d at 903-04.
155. - N.C. App. -, 731 S.E.2d 454 (2012).
156. Id. at _, 731 S.E.2d at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at_, 731 S.E.2d at 461 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-146(a)(3) (2013).
159. Osterhoudt, - N.C. App. at -, 731 S.E.2d at 461.
160. Id. at -, _, 731 S.E.2d at 459-60, 462. The court found evidence sufficient to
support violations of the following:
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that [the] defendant violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a), [the
patrolman's] testimony establishe[d] objective criteria justifying the
stop."'6 '
Close analysis of Barnard, Ivey, McLamb, and Osterhoudt
reveals that North Carolina courts were already following a Booker-
type approach in their application of the totality-of-the-circumstances
test for reasonableness. When the totality of the circumstances
indicates an objectively reasonable basis for a stop independent of the
officer's mistake of law, the stop is valid under both Booker and the
pre-Heien line of North Carolina cases. When the totality of the
circumstances offers no further objective grounds for a stop beyond
the officer's mistake of law, the court has no difficulty finding the stop
unconstitutional. Given this strong support in prior precedent, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina would have no trouble adopting a
rule taken from a federal circuit court opinion.
B. Policy Reasons to Adopt Booker
In addition to its consistency with North Carolina precedents, the
Booker approach to officers' mistakes of law serves important policy
interests. The Booker rule properly balances the individual liberty
and privacy concerns protected by the Fourth Amendment while
promoting efficient and effective law enforcement practices. Police
officers are still free to initiate stops based on misunderstandings of
(1) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(d)(3-4) since ... crossing the double yellow line
constitutes a failure to obey traffic-control devices;
(2) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(d)(1) because by crossing the double yellow line, [the]
defendant failed to stay in his lane; and
(3) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-153 as [the] defendant failed to stay close to the right-hand
curb of Fifth Street when he veered over the double yellow line.
Id. at _, 731 S.E.2d at 462.
161. Id. at _, 731 S.E.2d at 462. Notably, the court concluded its opinion by briefly
distinguishing Helen and McLamb. See id. ("We note that because [the patrolman's]
reason for stopping [the] defendant was not based solely on his mistaken belief that
defendant violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(a) but because [the] defendant crossed the
double yellow line, we find the present case distinguishable from other cases where our
Court has held that an officer's mistaken belief a defendant has committed a traffic
violation is not objectively reasonable and, thus, violates a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights." (citing Heien COA 1, 214 N.C. App. 515, 520-21, 714 S.E.2d 827, 831
(2011), rev'd, 366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012); State v. Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654, 658-
59, 712 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2011), affd 365 N.C. 415, 720 S.E.2d 388 (2012) (per curiam);
State v. McLamb, 186 N.C. App. 124, 127, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007))). Burke is
inapplicable here because that case involved an objectively unreasonable stop. See State v.
Burke, 212 N.C. App. 654, 658-59, 712 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2011), affd, 365 N.C. 415, 720
S.E.2d 388 (2012) (per curiam).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the law; courts will simply suppress evidence obtained from such
stops upon proper motion at trial. The General Assembly must pass
clear, enforceable laws and update archaic language,162 and police
departments must provide adequate training for their officers.16 1
Additionally, the Booker rule places law enforcement and normal
citizens on more equal footing with respect to their mistakes of law-
if society penalizes citizens for their mistakes of law, so too should it
chasten law enforcement officials for theirs.'6
The Booker approach also echoes the policy-based reasoning
behind the Whren line of cases. The Supreme Court of the United
States has long held that the officer's underlying motivation for a
traffic stop is irrelevant to the reasonableness analysis, so long as the
objective circumstances surrounding the stop support objectively
reasonable suspicion.'6 5 Regardless of whether the motivation for the
stop was based on pretext or a mistake of law, the stop should be
upheld as long as an actual law is being violated.
162. See Heien COA I, 214 N.C. App. 515, 520-21, 714 S.E.2d 827, 830-31 (2011), rev'd,
366 N.C. 271, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012). The United States Supreme Court had occasion to
weigh in on archaic statutory language in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972). At issue in Papachristou was the City of Jacksonville's vagrancy ordinance, the
"early English law" origins of which were evident by its antiquated language. See id. at
161. The ordinance classified as "vagrants" a number of types of people and individuals
who engaged in certain activities, including "lewd, wanton, and lascivious persons, ...
common railers and brawlers, ... [and] habitual loafers." Id. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting
JACKSONVILLE, FLA. ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)). The Court struck down the law,
finding it "void for vagueness." Id. at 162. Following invalidation of similar laws by
appellate courts throughout the country, drafters of vagrancy laws rewrote them "by
limiting 'loitering' or 'vagrancy' to a particular place, scope, or illicit purpose," which most
courts subsequently upheld on review. T. Leigh Anenson, Comment, Another Casualty of
the War ... Vagrancy Laws Target the Fourth Amendment, 26 AKRON L. REV. 493, 500-06
(1993).
163. See Logan, supra note 31, at 103-09 ("[T]he most promising solution lies in
improving both the amount and quality of substantive law police training, both pre- and
in-service, to promote police legal knowledge and help ensure that mistakes are, if not
eradicated, at least minimized in number.").
164. Cf Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) ("[E]venhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather
than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.").
165. See United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[R]egardless of
whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile may be
engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic
violation."), aff'd, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153
(2004) ("[A]n arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is
irrelevant to the existence of probable cause." (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13)); United
States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding an arguably pretextual
stop where officers observed the defendants commit two minor traffic violations).
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Whren also stands for the proposition that courts cannot and
should not have to assess variations in police enforcement practices.'"
Similarly, courts should not be forced to read into variations in officer
training from the potentially numerous police departments within
their jurisdiction.16 7 Again, the existence of a readily apparent,
independent, and objective reason for a stop forecloses case-by-case
inquiry into training standards and improves judicial efficiency and
fairness.
C. Necessary Limitations
The Booker court simply stated its rule and applied it to the facts
at hand without further elaboration. However, for the Booker rule to
function properly and maintain the appropriate Fourth Amendment
balance, important safeguards must be in place. Or, alternatively,
these safeguards may be viewed as positive externalities that should
result from the rule's diligent application.
Given the sheer volume of traffic regulations in any jurisdiction,
an officer who cannot find an ex post violation as grounds for a stop is
simply not trying hard enough.'68 But courts should not appear to
invite subjectivity into the analysis. The independent, objectively
reasonable grounds for the stop must be readily apparent to the trial
court ruling on a motion to suppress, or to the appellate court in its
review of the record. Preferably, the government should demonstrate
these independent, objectively reasonable grounds using the most
impartial means available-video from the officer's dashboard
166. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 816.
167. Cf Vodak v. City of Chicago, 624 F. Supp. 2d 933, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (describing
the higher standard for imposing liability due to training standards), rev'd on other
grounds, 639 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2011); People v. Rosario, 585 N.E.2d 766, 767-69 (N.Y.
1991) (discussing difficulties in evaluating officer conduct where different types of officers
undergo different training programs); DeLaire v. Kaskel, 842 A.2d 1052, 1054-56 (R.I.
2004) (same).
168. See Orin Kerr, Can a Police Officer Lawfully Pull Over a Car for a Traffic
Violation Based on an Erroneous Understanding of the Traffic Laws?, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/21/can-a-police-
officer-lawfully-pull-over-a-car-for-a-traffic-violation-based-on-an-erroneous-
understanding-of-the-traffic-laws/; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)
(recognizing the "multitude" of traffic and equipment regulations in a given jurisdiction).
For example, Professor Paul Butler described riding in a police cruiser with an officer
friend and playing a game his friend had contrived called "Stop That Car!" in which Butler
"pick[s] a car-any car-and [his officer friend] stops it." PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET
FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 24-25 (2009). Butler insists that his friend "is a
good cop" because "[h]e waits until he has a legal reason to stop the car. It doesn't take
long, never more than three or four blocks of following. There are so many potential
traffic infractions that it is impossible to drive without committing one." Id. at 25.
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camera, 169 photographs of the vehicle once it has been impounded, 7 0
or the contemporaneous police report"'-though officer testimony at
the suppression hearing should also suffice. That way, the integrity of
the independent grounds is preserved, and the reviewing court can
properly make the objective, detached analysis that the Fourth
Amendment requires.
This requirement-a separate, objectively reasonable basis for a
stop-may necessitate changes in police training procedures. Similar
changes occurred following the application of the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.'72
Adoption of the Booker rule could require increased officer training
in statutory law. In fact, one scholar has argued that "the most
promising solution [to police mistakes of law] lies in improving both
the amount and quality of substantive law police training ... to
promote police legal knowledge and help ensure that mistakes are, if
not eradicated, at least minimized in number.""' Indeed, a 1973
169. See David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as
Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357,
360 (2010). In fact, a bill was introduced in the North Carolina General Assembly in
March 2013, which would mandate that "[a] person who is charged with an impaired
driving offense must have his or her conduct at the incident site and the breath-testing site
video recorded," with very limited exceptions. S.B. 449, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess., § 1 (N.C. 2013). However, the bill was referred to the Senate Rules Committee after
its first reading and has seen no action since. Senate Bill 449 Information/History, N.C.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://ncleg.net/gascripts/billlookup/billlookup.pl?Session=2013&BililD
=S449 (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). The trend appears to be the outfitting of officers with
Body-Worn Video (commonly known as "head cameras"), consisting of video and audio
recording equipment that is attached to the officer like a Bluetooth earpiece. See Harris,
supra, at 360. For a discussion on whether police officers should be required to wear
cameras that record their interactions with the public, see If Police Encounters Were
Filmed, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/22
/should-police-wear-cameras.
170. But, while a picture is worth a thousand words, an officer's testimony may still
carry more weight than photographs taken pursuant to an impoundment. See People v.
Watkins, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding probable cause for a traffic
stop where the officer testified that the defendant's driver's side brake light was not
functioning properly, regardless of photographs taken of the impounded vehicle showing
all brake lights working).
171. See, e.g., State v. Causey, 540 S.E.2d 696, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (utilizing a
police report in assessing whether the defendant's conduct gave rise to reasonable,
articulable suspicion); State v. Carlson, No. CX-02-225, 2003 WL 22889585, at *1-2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2003) (same); State v. Etherington, 172 Ohio App. 3d 756, 2007-Ohio-
4097, 876 N.E.2d 1285, 1290, at 1 12 (same).
172. See David E. Steinberg, Zealous Officers and Neutral Magistrates: The Rhetoric of
the Fourth Amendment, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019, 1038-40 (2010) (discussing
empirical studies of changes in police training, including improved training on
constitutional search and seizure law, following Mapp v. Ohio, 376 U.S. 643 (1961)).
173. Logan, supra note 31, at 103.
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report of the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals
recommended that only ten percent of four hundred police training
hours be dedicated to "Law."174 Little has changed in the interim-a
2006 survey reported that a median of thirty-six hours (representing a
mere eight percent) of instructional time was devoted to criminal
law."' While it is true that law enforcement officers cannot
realistically be expected to construe statutes and ordinances with the
same proficiency as lawyers and judges, they can be expected to know
the laws they choose to invoke while on ordinary patrol.' Thus,
when independent, objectively reasonable grounds for a stop are
readily apparent, the Booker rule may be effectively and equitably
applied.
CONCLUSION
The role of officers' mistakes of law in the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness inquiry has been a divisive issue across state and
federal jurisdictions in recent decades. Under the majority rule,
officers' mistakes of law, even if objectively reasonable, cannot
provide the necessary reasonable suspicion to support a traffic stop.
A minority of courts take the opposite view and excuse objectively
reasonable mistakes of law by law enforcement personnel. The D.C.
Circuit has taken an intermediate approach by forgiving an officer's
mistake of law as long as other, independent grounds for reasonable
suspicion are present.
In State v. Heien, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
"significantly, and ... unnecessarily" altered Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in North Carolina "by introducing subjectivity and
vagueness into [the] analysis and effectively overruling ... prior
precedent.""' The court should have adopted the Booker rule
followed by the D.C. Circuit, which would maintain the "just right"
Fourth Amendment balance and remain consistent with prior North
Carolina case law. But, courts must be diligent in maintaining the
174. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, TASK
FORCE ON POLICE, STANDARD 16.3: PREPARATORY TRAINING 394 (1973).
175. Brian A. Reaves, U.S. Dep't of Justice, State and Local Law Enforcement Training
Academies, 2006, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 6 tbl.11
(2009). In one extreme case, the court lamented that "officer training logs [gave] ... no
indication that [the officers] received any training whatsoever on Fourth Amendment
limitations" in a particular circumstance. Rosen v. King, 913 F. Supp. 2d 666, 680 (N.D.
Ind. 2012).
176. Logan, supra note 31, at 107.
177. State v. Heien, 366 N.C. 271, 283, 737 S.E.2d 351, 359 (2012) (Hudson, J.,
dissenting).
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sanctity of the Booker rule by requiring contemporaneous, objective
proof of independent grounds for reasonable suspicion.
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